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Sequence Covering for Efficient Host-Based
Intrusion Detection
Pierre-Francois Marteau
Abstract—This paper introduces a new similarity measure, the covering similarity, that we formally define for evaluating the similarity
between a symbolic sequence and a set of symbolic sequences. A pair-wise similarity can also be directly derived from the covering
similarity to compare two symbolic sequences. An efficient implementation to compute the covering similarity is proposed that uses a
suffix-tree data-structure, but other implementations, based on suffix-array for instance, are possible and possibly necessary for
handling very large-scale problems. We have used this similarity to isolate attack sequences from normal sequences in the scope of
Host-based Intrusion Detection. We have assessed the covering similarity on two well-known benchmarks in the field. In view of the
results reported on these two datasets for the state of the art methods, and according to the comparative study we have carried out
based on three challenging similarity measures commonly used for string processing or in bioinformatics, we show that the covering
similarity is particularly relevant to address the detection of anomalies in sequences of system calls.
Index Terms—Sequence Covering Similarity, Host-based Intrusion Detection, System Calls, Semi-Supervised Learning, Zero-Day
F
1 INTRODUCTION
INTRUSION Detection Systems (IDS) are more and moreheavily challenged by intrusion scenarios developed by
today’s hackers. The number of reported intrusion incidents
has dramatically increased during the last few years with
very serious consequences for organizations, companies and
individuals. As an example, the Troyan horse TINBA (which
stands for TINy BAnker) has targeted with apparent success
the worldwide banking system during the last three years
[1], [2], [3]. The detection of zero-day attacks (attacks that
have never been detected before) is even more challenging
since no pattern or signature characterizing this kind of
attack can be used to identify it. Furthermore, with the de-
velopment of the IoT, the rate of the production of sequences
of system calls, i.e. sequential data used to access, manage,
or administrate connected equipments, is exploding. Hence,
the need to develop and use efficient intrusion detection
algorithms that can identify, isolate and handle suspicious
patterns in sequential information flows is evermore press-
ing with time.
This paper addresses the detection of (unknown) anoma-
lies in symbolic sequential data with a specific focus on
sequences of system calls within the scope of intrusion
detection. A system call is a request to the kernel of an
operating system to provide a service on behalf of the user’s
program. System calls are used to manage the file system
and available hardware, control processes, and to provide
interprocess communication. Thus, a sequence of system
calls corresponds to the sequential list of service requests
sent by a process to the kernel, and as such, it constitutes a
trace that describes the behavior of the monitored process.
The detection of abnormal system call sequences is chal-
lenging for the following reasons:
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1) the anomalies are contextual: the occurrence of a system
call can be considered as abnormal given its context of
occurrence, basically given the subsequences of system
calls that occur before and after it,
2) the anomalies can be collective: a subsequence as a
whole can be considered as abnormal,
3) the variability of system call sequences is very high
mainly because they are of varying length (a low num-
ber to a few thousand system calls) and the alphabet on
which the system calls are defined is quite high (more
than 300 for the Linux system),
4) if subsequences can be seen as discriminative features,
the combinatorics increases dramatically with the size
of the subsequences. This prohibits the use of n-gram
features for example, when n is above a low number of
system calls (4, 5).
Bioinformatics has proposed over the years a great num-
ber of similarity measures [4], [5], [6] to compare pairs
of sequences or provide multiple sequence alignments for
sets of sequences. These editing distances cover partially
the above-mentioned difficulties and have been used with
great success to evaluate similarities and dissimilarities in
sequences of nucleotides, some of them allowing for the
isolation of abnormal subsequences [7]. In addition, they
have been successfully adapted to cope with sequences of
system calls [8]. However, the quadratic time complexity
of most of these similarity measures and the need for the
computation of the whole similarity matrix limit their use to
small to medium size problems. Approximate computations
of these measures along with extremely parallel hardware
are required to address large-scale problems [9].
In this context, designing an algorithm that can some-
how profit from subsequences of any size to evaluate the
pairwise similarity of sequences with a significantly lower
time complexity is challenging. Furthermore, in the scope of
anomaly-based intrusion detection, if this similarity mea-
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sure can be used to compare a test sequence to a set of
normal sequences, it can result in a quite and efficient
intrusion detection approach.
Our main contribution is the description of an efficient
algorithm (SC4ID, which stands for Sequence Covering for
Intrusion Detection) based on the concept of a so-called
optimal-covering of a sequence by a series of subsequences
extracted from a predefined set of sequences. We demon-
strate in this paper that this algorithm is efficient, at least
in terms of accuracy and response time to isolate attack se-
quences that have never been observed (zero-day settings).
Indeed, as its implementation is based on generalized suffix-
trees (or suffix-arrays), it requires a relatively large memory
overhead.
The second section of this paper briefly reports the
related key works. We detail the SC4ID algorithm in the
third section and evaluate it in the fourth section on two
distinct sequences of system call benchmarks. On the small-
est size benchmark we compare the proposed similarity
measure with three baseline similarity measures commonly
used in bioinformatics to estimate the similarity of symbolic
sequences. We discuss our results in the fifth section before
concluding this study in section six.
2 CONTEXT AND RELATED WORKS
In a broad sense we address anomaly detection in sequential
data [10] while focusing on intrusion detection in cyber-
physical systems. Intrusion [11] refers to possible security
breaches in (cyber-)systems, namely malicious activity or
policy violations. It covers both intrusions per se, i.e. attacks
from the outside, and misuse, i.e. attacks from within the
system. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is thus a device
that monitors a system for detecting potential intrusions.
The IDS will be referred to as NIDS if the detection takes
place on a network and HIDS if it takes place on a host
of a network. Furthermore, we distinguish i) signature-
based IDS approaches, that detects attacks by looking for
predefined specific patterns, such as byte sequences in net-
work packets, or known malicious sequences of instructions
used by malware, to ii) anomaly-based intrusion detection
systems that were primarily introduced to detect unknown
attacks (zero-day attacks).
In this work we exclusively address host intrusion
detection system (HIDS) through semi-supervised anomaly-
based approaches. Since Forrest’s pioneering work [12]
most of HIDS (at least in the UNIX/LINUX sphere)
use system call sequencesas their primary source of
information. Generally, sequences of system calls are
represented as sequences of integer symbols, for which the
order of occurrence of the symbol is of crucial importance.
Numerous work and surveys have been published in
the area of anomaly detection in the scope of intrusion
detection, see [13] [14], [15] for recent studies. If we reduce
the area of interest to anomaly detection in sequential data,
four avenues for handling symbolic sequences are mainly
followed:
Window-based approaches [16] are quite popular since
a fixed size window enables a wide range of statistical,
knowledge-based and machine learning techniques to be
applied in a straightforward manner. A fixed-size window
is first defined, and then it progressively slides along the
tested sequence. Each window (basically a fixed-size sub-
sequence) is in general represented by a feature vector.
Then, models such as the one class Support Vector Machine
[17], Multi Layer Perceptron and Convolutional Neural Net-
works [18] are used to provide a score for deciding whether
an anomaly is present or not.
In this framework, an aggregation of each window (that
is sliding all along the sequence) score is necessary to get a
global decision at the sequence level. The prediction score
is used to detect and locate the position of the anomalies
inside the test sequence if any.
Global kernel-based approaches [19] process each
sequence as a whole and a pair-wise sequence kernel
(string kernel) is used to provide the sequence space with
a similarity measure. The k-Near-Neighbor rule or any of
the so-called kernel machine methods can then be applied
to model the ’normal’ clusters and isolate the ’anomalies’.
These approaches find their roots in text processing [20]
(Levenshtein’s distance) or in Bioinformatics [4], [21] (Smith
and Watermans), [5] (Needleman-Wunsch), [22] (BLAST)
and Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) or Longest
Similar Subsequence [23] [24]. Such methods do not seem to
outperform window-based approaches and are in general
much more costly in term of algorithmic complexity than
state of the art methods.
Generative approaches, essentially Hidden Markov
Models (HMM) [25] [26] [27], Conditional random Fields
(CRF) [28] [29] or Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN, LSTM,
etc.) [30] [31] have been used with apparent success on
various intrusion detection tasks, such as payload analysis
or Network Layer Intrusion Detection or HIDS. However,
the choice of parameters such as the order of the Markovian
dependency, number of hidden variables, etc., is often the
result of a compromise to avoid over-fitting, and long-term
dependency is not necessarily easily modeled.
Language-based approaches have been proposed
initially to extract very simple n-gram features to enhance
a vector space model similar to the one used in text
mining [32], [33]. Recently, a much ambitious model
has been proposed that proposes to enact phrases and
sentences, hence a language, from sequences of system
calls [34]. Nevertheless, these approaches suffer from the
combinatorics explosion. When simple n-grams models
are used (with n lower than 5 or 7) the size of the vector
space model is very high (several millions of dimension)
and in general the lack of available data to train the model
limits its accuracy. In the case of Creech et al. approach
[34], the combinatorics is much higher with an estimated
feature space dimension of 1016 which makes this model
intractable for common hardware.
The approach we present below relates to the (global)
kernel-based family. Each sequence is thus considered as
a whole, regardless of its length. All the specificity and
novelty of the method relies on a quite simple similarity
measure, that we call covering similarity. To our knowledge,
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this similarity measure has not been yet proposed for se-
quence comparison, specifically in the context of intrusion
detection. It is defined to evaluate how close a sequence
is to a set of supposedly ’normal’ sequences. A simple
threshold is used to decide whether an unknown sequence
is ’normal’ or should be considered as an anomaly. The main
advantages of our approach are:
• apart from a decision threshold, it is parameter-free, in
particular it does not rely on a window size,
• it is incremental and can be set up ’online’,
• it is interpretable since it easily enables the location of
abnormal areas in long sequences,
• it supports a very efficient instance selection scheme to
iteratively improve the ’normal’ model, without over-
loading it with unnecessary instances,
• it is quite efficient compared to other machine learning
based models and scales well compared to classical
sequence alignment kernels (which, in general, are at
least in O(n2) complexity) such as string kernels, the
Longest Common Subsequence or the Smith and Wa-
terman similarities, due to the suffix-tree and suffix-
array data structures on which the implementation of
our algorithm relies.
• Furthermore, it does not rely on pairwise distance
calculation between sequences, but on the distance
between a sequence and a set of reference sequences,
which also drastically reduces its computational com-
plexity.
3 THE SC4ID ALGORITHM
The overall principle of the SC4ID algorithm is straightfor-
ward. It is depicted in algorithm 1 and presented in Fig. 1.
Given a set of sequences considered as normal sequences, S,
and a threshold σ ∈ [0; 1], SC4ID evaluates the similarity of
an unknown sequence s with the elements of S according
to a similarity measure S (s, S) that consists in optimally
covering s with subsequences of elements of S. SC4ID can
be considered as an implicit semantic-based approach if we
interpret the covering subsequences as phrases constructed
from S, the corpus of training sequences. SC4ID also relates
to editing distances or time elastic measures such as the
Levenshtein’s distance. But instead of addressing the match-
ing problem through local editing operations (substitution,
insertion, deletion), it evaluates the minimal number of sub-
sequences that are required to build a complete covering of
a given sequence. Furthermore, it allows for subsequences
to be swapped, an operation that is very costly to imple-
ment in the editing distance framework. Most importantly,
SC4ID does not evaluate pair-wise sequence similarities to
construct a whole similarity matrix as for the Levenshtein’s
distance, but directly computes the similarity between a
sequence and a set of sequences which drastically reduces
its algorithmic complexity.
Behind this covering principle, we potentially manage
to use any subsequence that can be drawn from the set S,
without constraining neither the length of the subsequences
nor their number. The covering is in itself informative and
enables the location of anomalies spread inside a long
sequence. Furthermore one can interpret the covering as a
set of words that describes the sequence, seen as a phrase
Fig. 1. Principle of SC4ID. In the example, subsequence s is opti-
mally covered by three subsequences drawn from sequences in S,
[aae, gea, gd], which is a S-optimal covering for s.
(as conceptually proposed in [35]). Indeed the fact that a
fast algorithm exists to evaluate S-optimal coverings makes
it very relevant in the context of anomaly detection in
sequential data.
Finally, as described in algorithm 1, if the covering
similarity is above the threshold σ then the sequence s is
considered as normal, otherwise it will be considered as an
anomaly.
The only parameter in the SC4ID algorithm is σ. In a
semi-supervised anomaly-based detection framework ap-
plied to intrusion detection, all methods provide a confi-
dence measure (e.g a probability, a distance, a similarity
measure, etc.) and the definition and setting up of an σ-like
parameter in order to make the final decision. We discuss
the tuning of this parameter for the SC4ID algorithm in
subsection 4.3.
The specificity and novelty of the algorithm lie in the
way similarity S (s, S) is defined. We introduce hereinafter
some definitions and notation to detail the formal definition
of this similarity measure.
3.1 Definitions and notation
Let Σ be a finite alphabet and let Σ∗ be the set of all
sequences (or strings) defined over Σ. We note  as the
empty sequence.
Let S ⊂ Σ∗ be any set of sequences, and let Ssub be
the set of all subsequences that can be extracted from any
element of S ∪ Σ. We denote by M (Ssub) the set of all the
multisets1 that we can compose from the elements of Ssub.
c ∈ M (Ssub) is called a partial covering of sequence
s ∈ Σ∗ if and only if
1) all the subsequences of c are also subsequences of s,
2) indistinguishable copies of a particular element in c
correspond to distinct occurrences of the same subse-
quence in s.
If c ∈ M (Ssub) entirely covers s, meaning that we can
find an arrangement of the elements of c that covers s
entirely, then we will call it a full covering for s.
Finally, we call a S-optimal covering of s any full cov-
ering of s which is composed with a minimal number of
subsequences in Ssub.
Let c∗S(s) be a S-optimal covering of s.
1. A multiset is a collection of elements in which elements are allowed
to repeat; it may contain a finite number of indistinguishable copies of
a particular element.
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We define the covering similarity measure between any
non-empty sequence s and any set S ⊂ Σ∗ as
S (s, S) =
|s| − |c∗S(s)|+ 1
|s| (1)
where |c∗S(s)| is the number of subsequences composing
a S-optimal covering of s, and |s| is the length of sequence s.
Note that in general c∗S(s) is not unique, but since all
such coverings have the same cardinality, |c∗S(s)|,S (s, S) is
well defined.
Properties of S (s, S):
1) If s is a non-empty subsequence in Ssub, then
S (s, S) = 1 is maximal.
2) In the worst case, the S-optimal covering of s has
cardinality equal to |s|, meaning that it is composed
only with subsequences of length 1. In that case,
S (s, S) = 1|s| is minimal.
3) If s is non-empty, S (s, ∅) = 1|s| (note that if S = ∅,
Ssub = Σ).
Furthermore, as  is a subsequence of any sequence in
Σ∗, we define, for any set S ⊂ Σ∗, S (, S) = 1.0
Note that the covering similarity between a sequence
and a set of sequences as defined in Eq. 1 enables the
definition of a covering similarity measure on the sequence
set itself. For any pair of sequences s1, s2 this measure is
defined as follows:
Sseq(s1, s2) =
1
2
(S (s1, {s2}) +S (s2, {s1})) (2)
where S is defined in Eq. 1.
Algorithm 1: SC4ID
input : S ⊂ Σ∗, a set of sequences
input : s ∈ Σ∗, a test sequence
input : σ ∈ [0, 1], a threshold value
output: a decision value: ’normal’ or ’anomaly’
1 Provide a S-optimal covering of s;
2 Evaluates S (s, S) according to Eq. 1;
3 if S (s, S) ≥ σ then return [’normal’, S (s, S) ];
4 else return [’anomaly’, S (s, S) ];
As an example, let us consider the following case:
s1 = [0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1]
s2 = [0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1]
S = {s1, s2}
s3 = [0,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,1]
s4 = [0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1]
The S-optimal covering of s3 2 is size 4, hence
S (s3, S) =
16−4+1
16 = 13/16, and the S-optimal covering
of s4 3 is size 8, leading to S (s4, S) = 16−8+116 = 9/16.
The main challenge for the SC4ID algorithm is to eval-
uate S (s, S) efficiently for a sufficiently large S and rel-
atively long sequences s such as to be able to process
common sequences of system calls. This essentially requires
2. ([0,0,1,1][0,0,1,1],[0,0,1,1][0,0,1,1]) is a S-optimal covering of s3
3. ([0,1],[0,1],[0,1],[0,1],[0,1],[0,1],[0,1],[0,1]) is a S-optimal covering
for s4
an efficient way to get S-optimal coverings for tuples (s, S)
constructed from general sequences of system calls.
3.2 Finding a S-optimal covering for any tuple (s, S)
The brute-force approach to find a S-optimal covering for a
sequence s is presented in algorithm 2. It is an incremental
algorithm that, first, finds the longest subsequence of s that
is contained in Ssub and that starts at the beginning of s.
This first subsequence is the first element of the S-optimal
covering. Then, it searches for the next longest subsequence
that is in Ssub and which starts at the end of the first
element of the covering, then adds it to the covering under
construction, and it is then iterated until reaching the end of
sequence s.
Algorithm 2: Find a S-optimal covering for s
input : S ⊂ Σ∗, a set of sequences
input : s ∈ Σ∗, a test sequence
output: c, a (S-optimal) covering for s
1 continue←− True;
2 start←− 0;
3 c∗ ←− ∅;
4 while continue do
5 end←− start+ 1;
6 while end < |s| and s[start : end] ∈ Ssub do
7 end←− end+ 1;
8 c←− c∗ ∪ {s[start : end− 1]};
9 if end = |s| then continue←− False;
10 start←− end;
11 return c;
Proposition 3.1. Algorithm 2 outputs a S-optimal covering for
sequence s.
Proof. i) First we observe that since all the subsequences of
length 1 constructed on Σ are included into Ssub, algorithm
2, by construction, outputs a full covering of s (meaning that
s is entirely covered by the subsequences of the covering
provided by the algorithm).
ii) Second we observe that, for all s1 and s2 in Σ∗ such
that s1 is a subsequence of s2, and any S ⊂ Σ∗, |c∗S(s1)| ≤
|c∗S(s2)|.
We finalize the proof by induction on n, the cardinality
(the size) of the coverings.
The proposition is obviously true for n = 1: for all
sequence s for which a covering of size 1 exists (meaning
that s is a subsequence of one of the sequences in S),
algorithm 2 finds the S-optimal covering that consists of s
itself.
Then, assuming that the proposition holds for n, such
that n ≥ 1 (IH), we consider a sequence s that admits a
S-optimal covering of size n+ 1.
Let s = s1 + s1, be the decomposition of s according to
the full covering provided by algorithm 2, where s1 is the
prefix of the covering (first element) and s1 the remaining
suffix subsequence (concatenation of the remaining covering
elements). + is the sequence concatenation operator. Simi-
larly, Let s = s∗1 + s
∗
1, be the decomposition of s according
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to a S-optimal covering of s. Essentially, s∗1, which is also a
prefix of s, is a subsequence of s1 (otherwise, since s∗1 is in
Ssub, algorithm 2 would have increased the length of s1 at
least to the length of s∗1). Hence, s1 is a subsequence of s
∗
1
and, according to ii), |c∗S(s1)| ≤ |c∗S(s∗1)| = n. This shows
that s1 is a sequence that admits a S-optimal covering,
c∗S(s1), of a size at most equal to n. According to (HI),
algorithm 2 returns such an optimal covering for s1. This
shows that the covering {s1} ∪ c∗S(s1) that is returned by
algorithm 2 for the full sequence s, is at most size n + 1,
meaning that it is actually a S-optimal covering for s of size
n+ 1. Hence, by induction, the proposition is true for all n,
which proves the proposition.
Algorithm 3: Find the first break location in s
between positions tb and te
1 Function breakDichoSearch(s, tb, te, S)
input : s ∈ Σ∗, a test sequence
input : tb < te < |s|, the index segment in which
looking for the break
input : S ⊂ Σ∗, a set of sequences
output: t, the searched breaking index position
2 t←− b(tb + te)/2c;
3 if t = tb and s[tb : te] ∈ Ssub then
4 return t+1
5 else
6 return t
7 if s[tb : t] ∈ Ssub then
8 return breakDichoSearch(s, t, te, S);
9 else
10 return breakDichoSearch(s, tb, t, S);
Algorithm 4: Find using a binary search a S-optimal
covering for s
input : S ⊂ Σ∗, a set of sequences
input : s ∈ Σ∗, a test sequence
output: c∗, a S-optimal covering for s
1 continue←− True;
2 start←− 0;
3 c∗ ←− ∅;
4 while continue do
5 t←− breakDichoSearch(s, start, |s|, Ssub);
6 c∗ ←− c∗ ∪ {s[start : t− 1]};
7 if t = |s| then continue←− False;
8 start←− t;
9 return c∗;
3.3 Algorithmic complexity and implementation con-
siderations
Algorithm 2 requires a fast way to test the existence of
a subsequence in the sequences of S. Similarly to many
algorithms in the field of information indexing and retrieval,
these algorithms face two difficulties when the size of the
data (the size of S and the average length of the sequences)
increases, namely memory consumption and response time.
These two aspects cannot be solved simultaneously and
require a compromise to be found. We discuss below some
potential implementations based on hashtable, suffix-tree or
suffix-array.
3.3.1 Hashtable implementation for the search of a subse-
quence
If response time is ideal, and memory space is not a prob-
lem, then one can implement a hashtable that stores all the
subsequences of S (more precisely the elements of Ssub).
By doing so, we will be able to know if a subsequence is a
member of Ssub in O(1) time complexity. Hence, the time
complexity to find the S-optimal covering for a sequence s
of average size n will be O(n) for this implementation.
On the other hand, if the average length of the sequences
in S is n, then, the space required to store all the elements
of Ssub is expressed in O(n2 · |S|).
This could be feasible for small size problems. However,
for long sequences, e.g. with an average length of 105
elements, and large S, e.g. 106 sequences, we need to store
O(1016) subsequences in the hashtable which is not feasible
in practice on common hardware.
3.3.2 Suffix-tree and suffix-array implementations for the
search of a subsequence
For medium to large size problems, we need to drastically
limit the space consumption.
In comparison to a hashtable implementation, a general-
ized suffix-tree implementation [36] [37] would reduce the
memory requirement to O(n · |S|), although, in general,
with a large proportionality constant (typically 10 to 100
in practice), and a slight increase of the computational
complexity for searching for a subsequence (O(m), where
m is the length of the subsequence that is searched).
In comparison, suffix-arrays [38], and specifically its
enhanced implementation [39], is a space-efficient data-
structure that reduces the memory consumption without
losing (too much) on the response time. As they are cache
friendly, a suffix-array can in practice enable handling much
larger sequence sets than a suffix-tree and is much easier to
parallelize. A suffix-array provides the search for a subse-
quence with O(m + log(n · |S|)) average time complexity
(where n is the average length of the sequence in S).
3.3.3 Overall time complexity
In our current implementation, we gave priority to speed
rather than memory consumption, while trying to run our
algorithm on common hardware. Thus we adopted a gen-
eralized suffix-tree implementation in Python4 that we have
modified to cope with sets of sequences of integers (each
integer corresponding to a system call) instead of sets of
strings. The sequence datasets, described below, that we
have used for our experiment fit easily in a generalized
suffix-tree. Hence, using a generalized suffix-tree implemen-
tation, the search for a subsequence of size n is O(n).
4. Python implementation of Suffix Trees and Generalized Suffix
Trees, https://github.com/ptrus/suffix-trees
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The main computing effort for algorithm 2 is located
in the second part of the test (at line 6), which consists of
checking whether the subsequence s[start : end] belongs to
the set of subsequences Ssub associated to S. As we have to
iterate along the sequence s to successively find the elements
of its covering, algorithm 2 would require searching O(|s|)
subsequences, leading to an O(|s|2) upper bound for the
total time complexity.
Indeed, a straightforward improvement of the brute-
force algorithm can be achieved. Instead of iterating along
the sequence s to find successively the elements of its cover-
ing, this improvement implements a dichotomic (or binary)
search to locate the extremities, that we call breaks, of the
subsequences that compose the covering. This improvement
is described in algorithms 3 and 4.
The improved search algorithm has a computational
complexity that is upper bounded by O(k · |s| · log(|s|)),
where k = |c∗S(s)| is the size of a S-optimal covering for
s. Note that, if the size, k, of the covering is of the same
order of magnitude as the length of s, then the ’improved’
algorithm would, in fact, require more time than the brute-
force one. Hence the improvement is only achieved when
the size of the covering is significantly smaller than the
length of the covered subsequence, which is the case in
general, except for abnormal sequences that we are aiming
to isolate. Such sequences are expected to be rare, and,
in principle, we could accept the extra computing cost if
we effectively manage to separate them from the flow of
numerous normal sequences that need to be processed.
In addition the previous time complexities for Algo-
rithms 2 and 1 do not depend on |S|, which means that
increasing the size of S will not impact on the processing
time. This property is particularly important for applications
for which |S| is potentially large such as in anomaly-based
intrusion detection for instance.
4 EXPERIMENT
UNM ADFA-LD
|S| 81 5951
min seq. length 7 75
max seq. length 183018 4494
mean seq. length 9031 462
std seq. length 25111 522
TABLE 1
Some statistics on the UNM and ADFA-LD datasets.
We have evaluated the SC4ID algorithm on two well-
known system call datasets provided respectively by the
University of New Mexico (UNM) [40] and the Australian
Centre for Cyber-Security, referred to as ADFA-LD [35].
Some statistics summarizing the content of these datasets
are given in Table 1. We have selected these two datasets
because i) their use by the research community in intrusion
detection covers a wide time span (1998-2013) and ii)
numerous results have been reported using these datasets
in various settings, which enable to compare our findings
to the state of the art.
We have used as baselines, three similarity measures
commonly used in text processing or bioinformatics,
namely the Levenshtein’s distance (LEV) [20], [41], the
Longest Common Subsequence (LCSq) [42], [43] and the
Longest Common Substring (LCSt) [44].
The longest common substring problem, also known
as the longest common contiguous subsequence problem,
is to find the longest string that is a substring of two or
more strings. The pairwise similarity based on the longest
common substring that we used is normalized as follows :
SLCSt(s1, s2) = LCSt(s1, s2)
max(|s1|, |s2|) (3)
where LCSt(s1, s2) is the length of the longest common
substring of s1 and s2. An implementation using suffix-trees
leads to a O(n + m) algorithmic complexity, where m and
n are the lengths of the pair of strings or sequences that are
compared.
The Longest Common Subsequence is similar to a
longest common substring problem, except that the symbols
of the longest subsequences do not need to be contiguous in
the input sequences, namely gaps are authorized. The pair-
wise similarity based on the longest common subsequence
that we used is normalized as follows :
SLCSq(s1, s2) = LCSq(s1, s2)
max(|s1|, |s2|) (4)
where LCSq(s1, s2) is the length of a longest common
subsequence of s1 and s2. Using a dynamic programming
implementation, the algorithmic complexity of LCSq
distance is O(nm), where m and n are the lengths of the
pair of strings or sequences that are compared. The LCSq
distance is conceptually close to the Smith and Waterman
[4] distance used in Bioinformatics.
The Levenshtein’s distance, also known as the edit
distance, is the minimum number of single-symbolic edit
operations (insertions, deletions or substitutions) required
to change one string or sequence into the other. Using
a dynamic programming implementation, the algorithmic
complexity of the Levenshtein’s distance is O(nm), where
m and n are the lengths of the pairs of strings or sequences
that are compared. The Levenshtein’s distance is conceptu-
ally close to the Needleman Wunsch [5] distance used in
Bioinformatics.
The pairwise similarity based on the Levenshtein’s distance
that we used is normalized as follows :
SLEV (s1, s2) = 1− LEV (s1, s2)
max(|s1|+ |s2|) (5)
where LEV (s1, s2) is the Levenshtein’s distance between
s1 and s2.
The averaged costs for the computation of the similarity
matrix required to solve the HIDS problem are
• O(k · n · logn) for S(s1, S)
• O(N · n) for SLCSt
• O(N · n2) for SLCSq and SLEV
where N is the size of the normal sequences used as train-
ing, n is the average length of the training and test sequences
and k is the average length of the S-optimal coverings of the
test sequences.
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Fig. 2. UNM dataset: histogram of the covering similarity distributions Sc(s, S) (left column), ranked covering similarity Sc(s, S) (middle column),
ROC curves (right column), when 10% (top row), 22% (middle row) and 38% (bottom row) of the normal data is used for training.
To assess the experimented algorithms on the binary
classification task that consists of separating attacks from
normal data, we use the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve that shows the detection rate (true positive rate) as a
function of the false alarm rate (false positive rate) as the
discrimination threshold of the classifier is varied. We use
the Area Under the ROC curve (AUC) as the global assessment
measure.
4.1 The UNM dataset
For our first experiment, we have considered the sendmail
system call traces from the relatively old UNM dataset [16].
These synthetic data were collected at UNM on Sun SPARC-
stations running unpatched SunOS 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 with the
included sendmail. We have adopted the setting described
in [45], basically 68 unique process traces in the normal
dataset (uniqueness is to ensure that no sequence appears
simultaneously in the training and validation subsets) and
13 process traces in the abnormal dataset (we have kept the
3 duplicated attack sequences in this set).
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Fig. 3. UNM dataset: Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) curves as a
function of the size of the training set as a percentage for 5 distinct runs.
The average curve is shown as a dotted line. The grey filled area shows
the +1/-1 standard deviation curves.
Fig. 4. UNM dataset: AUC curves as a function of the size of the training
set as a percentage for SC4ID (plain curve), LEV (circle), LCSt (star),
and LCSq (dotted line) similarity measures.
The experimental protocol for this data set and the
covering similarity is as follows
1) Initialization: randomly select 10% of the normal data
to build the ’normal’ model, i.e. the initial set of nor-
mal data, S, from which the tested similarity will be
evaluated.
2) Evaluation: for each of the remaining normal and attack
sequences, s , evaluate the covering similarity S (s, S).
Then rank the normal data according to their similarity
score. Finally evaluate the ROC curve, and assessment
measure (AUC).
3) Selection: from the previously ranked normal data,
select the normal sequence with the worst similarity
score, s−, and update the normal model with training
set S := S ∪ {s−}. Then loop in step 2 until 50% of the
normal data is used in training.
The same protocol is used for the other tested
similarities, except that the normalized distance to the
closest ’normal’ sequence is used instead of S (s, S).
Fig. 2 presents the histogram of the covering similarity
values (left column) for the ’normal’ (blue) and ’attack’
(red) data, the ordered similarity values in increasing
order (middle column) for the ’normal’ (blue dotted line)
and attack data (red, continuous line) and the ROC curve
(right column). In this figure, the top row corresponds to
a situation for which 10% of the normal data has been
randomly selected for training, the middle row where the
initial 10% of training data has been enriched using 12%
of the remaining normal data corresponding to the lowest
covering similarity scores, and finally, the bottom row
corresponds to an enrichment of the initial 10% of training
data using 28% of the remaining normal data. From top
to bottom, we show that the model improves its capacity
to separate attack data from normal data: the AUC value
that is initially .81, reaches .94 when 22% of the ’normal’
data is used as training and 1.0 when 38% of the ’normal’
data is used as training. In the middle column, we see that
the similarity scores for the normal data is progressively
tangent to the 1 constant curve (maximal similarity value),
while, for the attack data, it generally stays much lower,
although it increases slightly when the size of the training
set increases.
Figure 3 presents the AUC value obtained by the SC4ID
algorithm as the enrichment of the training data increases.
5 different runs have been carried out, each one being
initialized by randomly selecting 10% of the normal data.
The grey area corresponds to the +1/-1 standard deviation,
and the blue dotted line is the average curve. We can see on
this figure that the SC4ID algorithm improves quite rapidly
until reaching a perfect separation of the normal and attack
data when 38% of the normal data is used, regardless of
the initialization. This is a major and very promising result,
since the instance selection that is performed directly from
the covering similarity scores is working particularly well
on the UNM data.
Figure 4 compares the 4 tested algorithms on a single
run . In the Figure, one can see that the SC4ID algorithm
(plain curve) is the first to reach a perfect AUC value when
about 30% of the available normal data is used as training.
The Levenshtein similarity based algorithm (LEV) is the
second to reach a perfect AUC value when about 31% of the
available normal data is used as training data. The LCSq
algorithm reaches an asymptotic AUC value of .923 and is
unable to separate normal data from attack data. Due to
the presence of gaps in the longest common subsequences
that are extracted, some attacks become too similar to
normal data and perfect separation is no longer possible.
We deduce from this result that the Smith and Waterman
distance used in bioinformatics will not perform well either
in this classification task. Finally, the LCSt distance will
reach a perfect AUC value when 57% of the available
normal data is used as training data, which is almost twice
the size of training data than it was necessary for SC4ID or
LEV.
Table 2 gives the average elapsed time for each enrich-
ment iteration. We can clearly see that SC4ID is the faster
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Elapsed time
Similarity (sec.)
SC4ID 454
LCSt 653
LCSq(*) 27023
LEV(*) 37296
TABLE 2
Elapsed time for the four tested algorithms. SC4ID: Covering Similarity,
LCSt: Longest Common Substring, LCSq: Longest (non contiguous)
Common Subsequence, LEV: Levenshtein. (*) note that for LCSq and
LEV, 20 processor cores have been used.
algorithm, LCSt takes 44% more time and LCSq and LEV
take more than 6000% more time than SC4ID. Note that LEV
and LCSq were running on a 20 cores architecture while
SC4ID and LCSt have not been parallelized, due to their
suffix-tree implementation, and were running on a single
core.
4.2 The ADFA-LD dataset
The second experiment involves a much more recent bench-
mark dataset for HIDS assessment. Yhis benchmark has
been designed by the Australian Centre OF Cyber-Security
(ACCS). According to the authors, the ADFA-LD dataset
[34], [35] has been designed to reflect modern hacking
techniques, whilst using modern patched software as its
backbone. It is composed with a training set composed with
833 normal sequences, a validation set composed with 4373
normal sequences and a set of 746 attack sequences par-
titioned into 6 categories referred to as HydraFTP, Hydra-
SSH, Adduser, Java-Meterpreter, Meter-preter and Webshell.
Similarly to the UNM experiment, the experimental pro-
tocol for this data set is as follows :
1) Initialization: select the 833 sequences of the normal
training data to build the ’normal’ model, i.e. the ini-
tial set of normal data, S, against which the covering
similarity will be evaluated.
2) Evaluation: for all the remaining normal and all attack
sequences, s, evaluate the covering similarity S (s, S).
Then rank the normal data according to their similarity
scores. Finally evaluate the ROC curve and assessment
metrics.
3) From the previously ranked normal data, select 100
sequences of normal data with the worst similarity
score, S100, update the normal model S := S ∪ S100
and loop in step 2 until 50% of the normal data is used
in training.
When only 833 normal training sequences are used to
train SC4ID, one acquires the histogram of similarity scores
given in the top of Fig. 5. A red peak of maximal simi-
larity (1.0) exists, meaning that some attack data (actually
32 sequences) are exact subsequences of the 833 normal
training data. When we remove these 32 attack sequences,
one observes a small remaining red peak with high covering
similarity close to 1.0. This peak corresponds to 11 attack se-
quences that have a covering of size 2, i.e. that are composed
of two subsequences that belong to the set of training data.
This situation for which attack sequences can be exact
subsequences of normal data is a bit surprising. We do not
have to investigate the nature of such subsequences. Rather,
Fig. 5. Histogram of the covering similarity for normal validation data
(blue), and attack data (red). Top: all the attacks are considered. Notice
the red pick with maximal similarity, 1.0, corresponding to attacks that
are exact subsequences of the train sequences. Bottom: the same
histogram when the 32 attacks with covering similarity equal to 1.0 are
removed. Notice the remaining small peak of high similarity close to 1.0
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Fig. 6. ADFA-LD dataset: histograms of the covering similarity distributions Sc(s, S) (left column), ranked normalized covering similarities Sc(s, S)
(middle column), ROC curves (right column), when 833 normal data (top row), 833 + 500 normal data (middle row) and 833 + 1000 normal data
(bottom row) is used for training.
we take the opportunity to highlight an obvious limitation
of SC4ID: it is completely blind to this kind of situation.
Complementary approaches are required to specifically ad-
dress this issue if any such situation exists.
Fig. 6 presents the histogram of the covering similarity
values (left column) for the ’normal’ (blue) and ’attack’
(red) data, the ordered similarity values in increasing order
(middle column) for the ’normal’ (blue dotted line) and
attack data (red, continuous line) and two ROC curves
(right column): the black continuous line curve corresponds
to the situation where all the attack data is retained, the
blue dotted line corresponds to the situation where the 32
attack sequences that are exact subsequences of the 833
normal training data have been removed. In this figure, the
top row corresponds to the situation where only the 833
normal training sequences are used for training, the middle
row where the initial 833 sequences have been enriched
using 500 sequences of the remaining normal data that have
the lowest covering similarity, and finally the bottom row
corresponds to a an enrichment of the initial 833 training
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Fig. 7. ADFA-LD dataset: AUC curves as a function of the number of
normal data added to the initial training set. The black continuous line
corresponds to the situation for which the sequences of attacks that are
an exact subsequence of a normal data have been removed. The blue
dotted line corresponds to the case where no sequence of attacks has
been removed.
sequences using the 1000 sequences of the remaining nor-
mal data having the lowest covering similarity. From top
to bottom, we show that the model improves its capacity
to separate attack data from normal data: the AUC value
that is initially .84/.88, reaches .93/.97 when 500 normal
sequences have been added to the initial training data and
.96/99 when 1000 normal sequences have been added to the
833 initial training set. Similarly as observed for the UMN
dataset, in the middle column, we see that the similarity
score for the normal data is progressively tangent to the 1
constant curve, while, for the attack data, it generally stays
much lower, although it does increase slightly.
Fig. 7 presents for this experiment the AUC values
for the algorithm as the enrichment of the training data
increases. We can see on this figure that the SC4ID algo-
rithm improves rapidly until reaching an almost perfect
separation (when the attacks that are subsequences of the
training data have been removed) of the normal and attack
data when 1400 normal data have been used to enrich the
initial 833 training set. Here again, the instance selection that
is performed directly from the covering similarity scores
is working particularly well. Nevertheless, we notice after
adding 1400 sequences that the algorithm is a little less
efficient with an AUC value that drops from .975/.998 to
.971/.992. The explanation is that a remaining few attacks
(precisely the 11 sequences mentioned earlier that have
a covering of size 2 when using only the 833 training
sequences) become subsequences of some of the last added
normal subsequences to the training set. The similarity for
these few attacks reaches the maximal value, namely 1.0,
and they cannot be separated anymore, hence a lower AUC
value.
4.3 Setting up the σ parameter
The covering similarity being normalized in [0, 1], the choice
for σ is constrained in the unit interval. Fig. 2 and Fig.
6 show that, when enough normal training data has been
selected using the procedure that consists of selecting first
Fig. 8. Elapsed time in seconds during each step of the enrichment
procedure for the UNM (dotted black line) and ADFA-LD (continuous
blue line) datasets.
the normal sequences having the lowest similarity score,
we can reach an almost perfect separation between attack
and normal sequences using σ / 1.0. According to our
experiments on system calls, selecting σ = .97 will lead to
the result that small size coverings (no more than 3% of the
size of the test sequence) will lead to a high detection rate
with a very low false alarm rate. It also leads to a relatively
small training set since only about 30% of the available
normal data are used for training in this case. We doubt
that a general rule for selecting σ exists. The fine-tuning of
σ is application-dependent.
4.4 Runtime consideration
We have not been able to provide a comparative study on
the ADFA-LD dataset, due to the too high time complexity
of the three other similarities (LEV, LCSt, LCSq). In partic-
ular, given the dataset statistics presented in Table 1 and
the quadratic complexity of LEV and LCSq measures, we
estimate that, if we use these two measures, it would require
about 5 months of computation for achieving the results on
a simple core of Intel i7 architecture, while it takes about 15
minutes for SC4ID using the same hardware. Consequently,
we only discuss hereafter runtime matters for the SC4ID
algorithm.
Fig. 8 presents the elapsed time expressed in seconds
for each iteration of the enrichment process carried out by
SC4ID for the UNM (dotted curve) and ADFA-LD (contin-
uous curve) datasets. Each step of this process involves the
construction of a suffix-tree based on the training (normal)
data, S, and the extraction of the S-optimal coverings for
the validation (normal) and attack data. These curves have
been obtained on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU @
2.60GHz laptop running an Ubuntu 16.10 release. Note that
between two successive tests, the training data increases by
one sequence for the UNM dataset and 100 sequences for
the ADFA-LD dataset; conversely the validation (normal)
dataset is reduced by one sequence and 100 sequences
respectively. Hence, as the enrichment increases, the number
of S-optimal coverings to extract decreases.
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We observe that the elapsed time is quite stable, around
450 seconds, for the UNM dataset and is rather independent
of the enrichment step. For the ADFA-LD dataset (which is
much larger in size than the UNM dataset), the elapsed time
varies around an average of about 900 seconds with a large
standard deviation (about 100 sec.). From the analysis of the
logs collected during our experiments, we found that i) the
time required to construct the suffix-tree is marginal, ii) the
elapsed time progressively shifts from the extraction of the
coverings for the normal sequences of the validation set to
the extraction of the coverings for the attack data. This is
due partly to the fact that the amount of normal validation
data to evaluate decreases, but also because the extraction
is becoming much easier for the normal data because the
size of the covering becomes very small in average as the
enrichment progresses (similarity scores are tangent to the
maximal similarity score for normal data).
Due to the variability in length of the sequences that are
added to the training data, it is difficult to progress deeper
into this analysis. Nevertheless, these curves show that, i)
for the various configurations corresponding to each step
of the enrichment process, the extraction of the S-optimal
coverings is bounded in time and ii) the two addressed
problems are processed in a quite reasonable elapsed time.
5 DISCUSSION
The UNM dataset, although relatively old and somewhat
outdated, gives a general view of the ability of the SC4ID
algorithm to separate normal data from attacks sequences.
Using this this dataset, we have been able to compare SC4ID
with three other similarity measures whose variants are
classically used in bioinformatics and text mining. From
this comparative study we can conclude that SC4ID is as
accurate as the Levenshtein’s distance but is much faster to
evaluate. SC4ID is also much more accurate and faster to
evaluate than the two other similarity measures.
We have not been able to provide a similar comparative
study on the ADFA-LD dataset due to the time complexity
of the other similarity measures.
The fact that the first results highlighted on the UNM
dataset for the SC4ID algorithm are still observable on a
much newer and reputedly difficult benchmark such as the
ADFA-LD dataset is particularly promising. In both cases,
the instance selection ability of SC4ID enables the rapid
improvement of the separability of attack sequences from
the normal ones. When the training data are sufficiently
representative of the normal activity, expressed in terms of
system call traces, the algorithm performs an almost perfect
separation. We have shown that, if the perfect separation
between normal and attack sequences is not achieved for
the ADFA-LD dataset, this is because some attack sequences
actually correspond exactly to some subsequences of the
normal sequences that are used to train the model. If this
kind of overlap is suppressed then one can expect a perfect
separability as shown in Fig. 7.
In addition, the covering similarity can be used effi-
ciently to decide whether a given normal sequence should
be part of the training data or not. Basically, when a lot of
normal data is available, which is actually the case for HIDS
application, it offers a data selection scheme with a stop
condition that can be easily set up according to the middle
columns of Fig. 2 and 6. When the ranked normal similarity
curve is tangent to the 1-constant horizontal line, SC4ID
will not further improve its capability to isolate anomaly
data (anomaly being clearly defined in the context of the
considered set of normal data).
To give some hints about how SC4ID compares with the
state of the art methods that have been tested on the ADFA-
LD dataset, we report hereinafter the results we found in
the recent literature:
In [46], bag of words and vector space models with tf
and tf-idf weightings were used. Authors report a slightly
less than 80% in accuracy for a False Positive rate of 30%.
In [47], a one-class SVM was evaluated using a feature
vector composed of n-grams of length 5. The authors report
an average accuracy of 70% at a False Positive Rate of about
20%.
In [48], a 10 fold cross-validation supervised classifica-
tion (which is a much easier task than the anomaly detection
task we are considering in this study, since attack data is
used to train the classifiers) has been conducted. Authors
report a AUC=0.93 for the best tested method (k-nn with
k=3), using an ’enhanced’ vector space model with n-grams
(n=2,3,4,5).
In [31], a deep learning ensemble approach (LSTM) has
been evaluated. Authors report an AUC value of 0.928 for an
aggregating method that is somewhat questionable, and an
AUC value of 0.859 for a classical voting ensemble method.
This implies that for a single LSTM model, the AUC value
would be at most .86.
In [34], a combinatorics ’semantic’ approach has been
set up. It requires enumerating all phrases of 5 words with
gaps, each word consisting of any subsequence (of any
length) extracted from the training data (we estimate at
about 6.1016 the number of such phrases). The authors,
actually the designers of the ADFA-LD dataset, report an
AUC = .95 after several weeks of computing effort.
In [49], authors proposed to reduce system call traces
by applying trace abstraction techniques. The approach
consists mainly of reducing the size of the alphabet, by
using meta-symbols, i.e. subsets that partition the alphabet.
Authors report a 12.69% False Positive rate for a 100% True
Positive rate when using a HMM model.
All these results demonstrate that SC4ID is well posi-
tioned among leading-edge approaches.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the design and implemen-
tation of SC4ID, a novel algorithm based on the concept of
sequence covering, to detect abnormal sequences of system
calls. It relates to a semi-supervised learning approach that it
is quite efficient to detect zero-day attacks, as far as enough
normal training data is available. Its main advantages com-
pared to the state of the art approaches are:
i) it is parameter-free, except for the decision threshold
σ. Hence no assumption need to be made on the data,
no windowing, no maximal length for the n-grams that
are taken into account, no hidden architecture (HMM,
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LSTM) need to be defined, no meta parameters (SVM,
RF) need to be tuned, etc.,
ii) the S-optimal covering provided by the measure is
interpretable and can be used to locate contextual and
collective anomalies in long sequences,
iii) it is incremental: the elements of the covering are pro-
gressively discovered and never modified afterwards.
Hence the algorithm can be easily setup for an online
exploitation,
iv) it enables a fast learning curve, using the efficient se-
quence selection procedure that can be used to sample
the (large)set of normal sequences in order to build a
minimal training set,
v) it scales well and runs easily on common hardware for
medium to large size problems, thanks to its n · log(n)
algorithmic complexity.
However, we have pointed out a limitation of the SC4ID
algorithm: it cannot separate sequences that are exact subse-
quences of the training set. However, any algorithm that
uses historical data to provide a regressive or predictive
scoring would also fail to correctly handle such a situation.
As a perspective, we can expect a speed up of the algo-
rithm when trace abstraction techniques, such as described
in [49], are used to reduce system call traces. This speed-
up, hopefully, could potentially be obtained without losing
(too much) on the accuracy. Parallelization of the algorithm
is also an issue that can be addressed, in particular in the
context of suffix-array implementations.
Finally, one may ask whether the covering similarity is
able to offer some useful solutions in other domain such as
bioinformatics, sequence mining (clustering, classification),
plagiarism detection, etc. In particular, the pair-wise simi-
larity defined in Eq. 2 could be tested in various context, to
evaluate the robustness and generality aspect of the concept
of sequence covering.
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